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I. INTRODUCTION
Granting a child's loss of consortium claim for a negligently injured
parent is a relatively young concept. In the past fifteen years since the
first decision granting a child recovery was handed down,' the courts
have been slow to alter traditional wisdom prohibiting such recovery.
In February 1993, the Nebraska Supreme Court in Guenther v. Stoll-
Copyright held by NEBRASKA LAw REVmw.
1. Berger v. Weber, 267 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 303 N.W.2d 424
(Mich. 1981).
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berg2 elected not to allow a child a right to recover loss of consortium
for a negligently injured parent. The court chose to emulate a long-
standing tradition held by a majority of states in denying a child such
recovery. As of now, sixteen states do allow a child to recover loss of
consortium for a negligently injured parent.3 Nebraska finds itself
siding with the majority. The District of Columbia and twenty-two
states, including Nebraska, deny such recovery.4
In Guenther, Nebraska appears to have chosen a path in the oppo-
site direction from the growing, albeit slow, trend across the country.
Since the Michigan Court of Appeals first allowed a right to recovery
in 1978, almost one state a year has decided to grant children the
right to a claim for loss of consortium, and it seems likely that others
2. 242 Neb. 415, 495 N.W.2d 286 (1993).
3. See Marquardt v. United Airlines, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Haw. 1992);
Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987); Villareal v.
State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989); Weitl v. Moses, 311 N.W.2d 259
(Iowa 1981) modified on grounds of statutorial misinterpretation, Audubon-Exira
v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983)(limiting recovery to
only those who qualify under controlling statute misinterpreted in Weitl); Higley
v. Kramer, 581 So. 2d 273 (La. Ct. App. 1991), writ denied, 583 So. 2d 483 (La.
1991); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980);
Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981); Pence v. Fox, 813 P.2d 429 (Mont.
1991); Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131 (Okla. 1990); Gallimore v. Children's
Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993), overruling High v. Howard, 592
N.E.2d 818 (Ohio 1992); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1990); Hay v.
Medical Center Hosp. of Vermont, 496 A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985); Ueland v. Pengo Hy-
dra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984); Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830 (W.
Va. 1990); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984); Nulle v. Gil-
lette-Campbell Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990).
4. See Jones v. Lifespring, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 426 (D.D.C. 1988); Green v. A.B. Hag-
glund and Soner, 634 F. Supp. 790 (D. Idaho 1986)(applying Idaho law); Gray v.
Suggs, 728 S.W.2d 148 (Ark. 1978); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858
(Cal. 1977); Lee v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986); Hinde v.
Butler, 408 A.2d 668 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305
(Fla. 1985); W.J. Bremer Co. v. Graham, 312 S.E.2d 806 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983), writ
denied 312 S.E.2d 787 (Ga. 1984); Dearborn Fabricating & Engin. v. Wickham,
551 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. 1990); Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263 (Kan.
1982); Durepo v. Fishman, 533 A.2d 264 (Me. 1987); Gaver v. Harrant, 557 A.2d
210 (Md. 1989); Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Barbera v.
Brod-Dugan Co., 770 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); General Elec. Co. v. Bush,
498 P.2d 366 (Nev. 1992); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., Inc., 295 A.2d 862 (N.J.
1972); De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 449 N.E.2d 406 (N.Y. 1983); Vaughn
v. Clarkson, 376 S.E.2d 236 (N.C. 1989); Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266 (N.D.
1908); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318 (Or. 1982);
Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co., 517 A.2d 1348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 540 A.2d
266 (Pa. 1988); Still v. Baptist Hosp., 755 S.W.2d 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)
Eleven states are currently undecided on the issue but most likely will have to
jump off of the fence on one side of the issue or the other in the next few years.
Those states include Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and
Virginia.
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will follow.5 Moreover, in Nebraska, loss of consortium is allowed for
a child in a wrongful death claim for a parent, and the parent is al-
lowed to recover consortium for a negligently injured child. Logically,
the next step would be to allow a child recovery for loss of consortium
for a negligently injured parent. Indeed, those courts that now allow
recovery have based their decision on the fact that refusing to allow a
child's claim breeds logical inconsistencies in tort law which are based
more on anachronisms than common sense.6
5. In order by year, the cases and states are: Berger v. Weber, 267 N.W.2d 124
(Mich. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981); Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Weitl v. Moses, 311 N.W.2d
259 (Iowa 1981), modified on grounds of statutorial misinterpretation, Audubon-
Exira v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983); Ueland v.
Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984) and Theama v. City of Keno-
sha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984); Hay v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vermont, 496
A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985); Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991
(Alaska 1987); Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989); Wil-
liams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131 (Okla. 1990); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463
(Tex. 1990); Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1990); and Nulle v. Gillette-
Campbell Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990); Higley v. Kramer, 581 So. 2d 273
(La. Ct. App. 1991) and Pence v. Fox, 813 P.2d 429 (Mont. 1991); Marquardt v.
United Airlines, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Haw. 1992); Gallimore v. Children's
Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993).
6. In Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993) the
Ohio Supreme Court granted the plaintiff-mother the right of filial consortium for
her negligently injured son. In so doing, the court immediately recognized that
this decision was inconsistent with its denial of a child's right of consortium for a
negligently injured parent in High v. Howard, 592 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio 1992) a case
decided just a year earlier. Citing the logical inconsistencies that appear in al-
lowing filial consortium and denying parental consortium, the court overturned
High. While noting that the court had undergone a change in composition since
the High decision, the court grounded its decision on the following factors:
Rather than perpetuate what we believe to be an unfair and legally un-
justifiable conclusion in High, we have chosen to overrule that deci-
sion.... Our critics may wish to perpetuate an anachronistic and sterile
view of the relationship between parents and children, but we seek to
distance ourselves from that view-point. Either the common law must
be modernized to conform with present-day norms, or it will engender a
lack of respect as being out of touch with the realities of our time.
Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (Ohio 1993).
In Guenther, the Nebraska Supreme Court cited High as foundation for its deci-
sion in denying recovery, prompting one to wonder if a similar change of heart
could occur in Nebraska in the future, especially since this state already allows
filial consortium. See infra note 116 and accompanying text. See also Ueland v.
Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 192 (Wash. 1984)(expressing difficulty un-
derstanding reluctance to compensate child).
In Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1990) the Texas Supreme court
rejected the argument that just because other jurisdictions did not allow a child a
right of recovery, the state of Texas should follow suit. The court refuted the
argument by stating" '[Tihat is no sufficient reason why an action should be sus-
tained.' Hill v. Kimball, 13 S.W.2d 59, 59 (Tex. 1890). This observation remains
valid today." Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1990).
[Vol. 73:432
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
The Nebraska Supreme Court refused to allow recovery based on
three traditional arguments which have seemingly always arisen
when any new type of tort cause of action has been launched: 7 (1) lack
of legal entitlement, (2) multiplicity of suits and double recovery, and
(3) calculation of damages. The immediate result of the court's deci-
sion to deny such loss of consortium claims is to permit several logical
inconsistencies to run rampant through Nebraska tort law. A careful
examination of each issue illuminates a rather unthoughtful decision
based more on outstanding precedent than a fear of increased litiga-
tion or double recovery. The long-term effect of Guenther is the denial
of a rational basis for providing a child with compensation. 'While op-
ponents of recovery argue that the child recovers vicariously through
the parent's award of consortium for the injured spouse,8 the child's
award will never be argued before a jury nor will the child actually
receive any compensation. Consequently, a child whose loss is real
enough to her is denied any type of independent award.
This Note will examine the history behind the loss of consortium
claim for a child and then discuss the three traditional notions the
In Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984) the Wisconsin
Supreme Court equated the situation with that of overturning precedent in al-
lowing the wife a right of recovery for consortium for a negligently injured hus-
band years earlier. The court quoted Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227
(Mich. 1960), in which the court allowed a wife's loss of consortium claim.
Were we to rule upon precedent alone, were stability the only reason for
our being, we would have no trouble with this case. We would simply
tell the woman to begone, and to take her shattered husband with her,
that we need no longer be affronted by a sight so repulsive. In so doing
we would have vast support from the dusty books. But dust the decision
would remain in our mouths throughout the years ahead, a reproach to
law and conscience alike. Our oath is to do justice, not to perpetuate
error.
Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 518 (Wis. 1984)(quoting Montgom-
ery v. Stevens, 101 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1960)).
There is one court, however, that discussed the inconsistencies in denying loss
of consortium for a negligently injured parent and dismissed those inconsisten-
cies as irrelevant. Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318,
333 (Or. 1982).
7. Indeed, primary examples of the threat of increased litigation haunting the gene-
sis of new tort claims can be found without looking further than consortium
claims in general. The same fears surrounded allowing the spouse a right of re-
covery for a negligently injured husband, Maureen Ann Delaney, WhatAbout the
Children? Toward an Expansion of Loss of Consortium Recovery in the District of
Columbia, 41 A. U.L. REv. 107, 108 (1991), and date back to wrongful death
claims for a spouse. Perhaps the Michigan Court of Appeals summed the situa-
tion up best when it stated "It]he rights of a new class of tort plaintiffs should be
forthrightly judged on their own merits, rather than engaging in gloomy specula-
tion as to where it will all end." Berger v. Weber, 267 N.W.2d 124, 129 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978).
8. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858,866 (Cal. 1977)(quoting Halberg v.
Young, 41 Haw. 634 (1957)).
1994]
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court employed to deny recovery: (1) lack of legal entitlement, (2) mul-
tiplicity and double recovery, and (3) calculation of damages. In addi-
tion, the fear that insurance premiums will greatly increase as a
consequence of allowing an award will be discussed. Finally, some
consideration will be given to the likelihood of the court reversing it-
self and allowing recovery sometime in the future.
II. BACKGROUND
A child's claim for loss of consortium for a negligently injured par-
ent sprouted from pre-existing consortium claims from other members
of the negligently injured victim's family. At common law, a claim for
loss of consortium by a child did not exist. However, a parent could
bring a cause of action for a negligently injured child.9 This discrep-
ancy arose due to the lost services provided by the child to the parent
in economic terms which were not reciprocated from the parent to the
child.1o Over time, Nebraska modified this approach and determined
that a child is not only a source of pecuniary benefit but a fountain of
companionship and love."' As a result, parents were allowed to re-
cover for this loss of companionship.12
A member of a family has a value to other members of a family
both socially and economically. The social value is of a definite and
ascertainable pecuniary value which results in parents being compen-
sated for the interruption of this social value when a child has been
negligently injured.13 The next logical step in this process is to bring
a claim for loss of a parent's society by a child when the parent has
9. Originally, loss of consortium claims date back to the 1600s. First, a husband
was allowed to recover for loss of his wife's domestic services. At common law, a
husband was allowed to recover loss of services for his wife or his children as a
result of the master-servant relationship. Wives and children were equated with
servants. Wives, however, were denied recovery for the loss of their husbands'
services.
Courts expanded the common law by permitting the husband to recover for
the loss of companionship, society, and comfort. Gradually, courts allowed recov-
ery in situations where the husband did not lose the domestic services of his wife.
Eventually, this type of consortium claim became dominant, although a cause of
action could only be brought by the husband. Courts expanded this notion as
well, eventually allowing wives and then children to recover. Delaney, supra note
7 at 111-12. See also David. P. Dwork, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a
Parent's Love, Care and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent,
56 B.U.L. REv. 722 (1976)(detailing history of consortium claims).
10. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 422, 495 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1993).
11. Id. at 422, 495 N.W.2d at 289-90.
12. See Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973). If recoverable
damages were restricted solely to a monetary value of a child's services, a child's
life would have little if any value. Thus, the court decided that Nebraska would
allow recovery for the tortious loss of consortium for a child. Id.
13. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 422, 495 N.W.2d 286, 290 (1993)(quoting
Williams v. Monarch Transp., 238 Neb. 354, 360, 470 N.W.2d 751, 755 (1991)).
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been negligently injured. If a parent could recover for the loss of her
child's affection and companionship, then it would appear that the
similarity of the relationships would authorize a court to grant recov-
ery to a child for the loss of a parent's care and affection. It seems
logical that no matter at which end the flow of care and affection is
interrupted, the tortfeasor causing the cessation of this companion-
ship should be liable for the damages to the injured parties.
III. CASE LAW OUTSIDE NEBRASKA
In 1978, Michigan was the first state to allow a child the right to
recover loss of consortium for a negligently injured parent in Berger v.
Weber.14 In Berger, a father brought an action on behalf of his daugh-
ter claiming loss of society and companionship from her mother who
was negligently injured in a car accident. The trial court granted the
defense's motion for summary judgment, denying the child a cause of
action for loss of consortium. The Michigan Court of Appeals over-
turned the trial court and granted recovery. On appeal to the Michi-
gan Supreme Court,' 5 the court of appeals' decision was affirmed. The
court reasoned that the child's loss of companionship from a negli-
gently injured parent was no more remote than that which occurred in
a child's wrongful death suit. The court also was not convinced that a
child's award for consortium was any more speculative or harder to
calculate than other consortium claims. Seeking to rid the courts of
the logical inconsistencies that resulted in allowing a child a right of
recovery in a wrongful death suit but not for a negligently injured par-
ent, the court granted the child a right of recovery.' 6
Massachusetts soon followed the Michigan decision in Ferriter v.
Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.17 in 1980. In Ferriter, the plaintiffs' par-
ent was paralyzed from the neck down in a work related accident.18
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized that the
common law at times protected the parent's sentiments in the parent-
child relationship but was silent as to the child's sentiments for an
injured parent. Notwithstanding years of precedent, the court deter-
mined that a child was legally entitled to relief and granted recovery
to the children.'9
14. 267 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). Some confusion may arise at this point.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court case of Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons,
Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980), was decided before the Michigan Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424
(Mich 1981). But as properly cited in Ferriter, Michigan was indeed the first
state to allow a child the right of recovery.
15. Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981).
16. Id. at 427.
17. 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980).
18. Id. at 691.
19. Id. at 695-96.
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IV. BORER v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, THE FOUNDATION FOR
NEBRASKA CASE LAW
The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled on the issue in Guenther on
February 12, 1993. Before discussing the facts and holding in
Guenther, it is necessary to discuss two previous cases, Hoesing v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.2 0 and Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.21
Guenther relies extensively upon Hoesing which in turn relies heavily
upon Borer. In order to gain more insight into the basis for the court's
decision, it is necessary to begin with a brief examination of Borer.
Patricia Borer was struck by a lighting fixture at the American Air-
lines terminal at Kennedy Airport. As a result of her injuries, her
nine children each filed a separate suit for loss of Ms. Borer's compan-
ionship and affection. Each individual child's suit sought damages of
$100,000. American Airlines demurred, contending that the children
failed to state a cause of action. The trial court sustained American
Airlines' demurrer and dismissed the suit.2 2 The California Supreme
Court affirmed the decision. The opinion, authored by Judge Tobri-
ner, denied recovery based on three grounds. First, Tobriner reasoned
that consortium is an intangible injury for which money cannot pro-
vide suitable recompense.2 3 Second, the growth of litigation in ordi-
nary accident claims as a result of children seeking recovery places too
great a cost on society.2 4 Third, a child was not entitled to recovery
under common law.2 5 Judge Tobriner continued to comment that the
increased insurance premiums resulting from children's consortium
claims would force more people to go without insurance. Such a re-
sult, coupled with the expenditure of resources in litigating these
claims, would prove too great a social burden to allow recovery.26
20. 484 F. Supp. 478 (D. Neb. 1980).
21. 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977).
22. Id. at 861.
23. See Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 479-80 (D. Neb. 1980);
Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982); Russell v. Salem Transp.
Co., Inc., 295 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1972).
24. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 536 P.2d 858, 860 (Cal. 1977). See Hoesing v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 479-81 (D. Neb, 1980); Dearborn
Fabricating & Engin. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1137 (Ind. 1990); Salin v.
Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 739-40 (Minn. 1982); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co.,
Inc., 294 A.2d 862, 864 (N.J. 1972).
25. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 536 P.2d 858, 861 (Cal. 1977). See Hoesing v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 479 (D. Neb. 1980).
26. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977). See also Salin v.
Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982)(citing increased insurance premi-
ums as one reason to deny recovery).
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V. HOESING v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., PRECURSOR
TO GUENTHER
The first significant case in Nebraska concerning a child's loss of
consortium claim occurred in the United States District Court for Ne-
braska in February 1980 in Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.27 In
Hoesing, children brought an action seeking damages for negligently
inflicted injuries to their parents by a third party tortfeasor. Since the
Nebraska Supreme Court had yet to rule on the issue, the district
court turned its attention to other jurisdictions. Based on this survey,
the court concluded that the children did not have a cause of action for
loss of parental consortium. 28 Hoesing relied heavily on Tobriner's
reasoning in Borer.29 Consequently, recovery was denied based in
large part on the three reccurring themes previously discussed: (1)
legal entitlement, (2) multiplicity of suits and double recovery, and (3)
calculation of damages.30 Quoting extensively from Borer, the district
court determined that the costs to society outweighed any purported
benefits that the children would receive through their award.31
VI. UELAND v. PENGO HYDRA-PULL CORP., BASIS FOR THE
DISSENT IN GUENTHER
In 1984, the Washington Supreme Court granted a child a right to
recover lost consortium for a negligently injured parent in Ueland v.
Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp.32 Eric Ueland, the father of two minor chil-
dren, Kimberly and William Ueland, suffered severe and permanent
mental and physical injuries when he was struck by a metal cable on ajob site while employed for Seattle City Light. Kimberly and William
brought an action for loss of consortium. Reynold's Metal Company
and Superior Electric Company moved for a dismissal in Washington
Superior Court. This motion was denied. A motion for discretionary
review was granted by the Washington Court of Appeals and the case
was then transferred to the Washington Supreme Court for disposi-
tion on the merits.s3
Previously in Washington, the courts had held that the adoption of
a cause of action for loss of consortium for a negligently injured parent
was an issue of public policy and best left to the discretion of the legis-
27. 484 F. Supp. 478 (D. Neb. 1980).
28. Id.
29. Interestingly, Hoesing predates the decision in Ferriter v. Daniel O'ConneU's
Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980), by seven months.
30. Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478 (D. Neb. 1980).
31. Id. at 479.
32. 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984).
33. Id. at 191.
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lature.34 The Washington Supreme Court rejected this notion and al-
lowed the Uelands to recover the companionship and affection they
lost as a result of their father's injuries.
The court attacked the three traditional arguments of lack of legal
entitlement, multiplicity of suits, and calculation of damages and suc-
cinctly refuted each claim. In regards to any lack of common law enti-
tlement for a child's consortium claim, the court cited the logical
inconsistencies in allowing a child to recover lost consortium for the
wrongful death of a parent, but not a negligently injured parent. Fur-
ther, the opinion noted that it is the court's responsibility to expand
the common law and recognize a cause of action when appropriate in-
stead of deferring to the legislature in abrogation of this responsibil-
ity.35 By joining claims, the court reasoned that the problem of
multiplicity of suits could be significantly reduced. Finally, the court
concluded that evaluating a child's consortium claim for a negligently
injured parent is no more speculative than other consortium claims
recognized in Washington.36
VII. GUENTHER, A CHILD'S CLAIM REJECTED
The Nebraska Supreme Court borrowed large portions of its rea-
soning from both Borer and Hoesing in rendering a decision in
Guenther. In fact, the court borrowed large portions of verbatim text
from Hoesing in drafting its opinion. Consequently, the same three
arguments used in both Borer and Hoesing reappear almost word for
word in Guenther.37
In Guenther, a minor child, six year old William Guenther, through
his father, Marvin Guenther, sued Shelly R. and Gail Stollberg, alleg-
ing that they had negligently injured the child's mother, Janis, caus-
ing the child to endure the loss of his mother's consortium. 38 Janis
had been injured in a motor vehicle accident and sustained severe
mental and physical injuries.39 The district court held that the child
had not stated a cause of action and sustained the Stollbergs' demur-
rer. The Guenthers decided not to amend, and the petition was dis-
missed. The Guenthers then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme
Court, asserting that the dismissal was erroneous and asking the
34. See Roth v. Bell, 600 P.2d 602 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)(holding that the legislature
would determine when a cause of action for loss of parental consortium is
appropriate).
35. Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984).
36. Id.
37. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 419-21, 495 N.W.2d 286, 288-89 (1993).
38. Id. at 415, 495 N.W.2d at 286.
39. Id. at 419-21, 495 N.W.2d at 288-89. Appellant's Brief at 3, Guenther v. Stoll-
berg (No. S-90-551). The facts of this case are limited at best. Even the appel-
lant's brief fails to state any facts surrounding the accident.
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court to recognize a cause of action for a minor child's loss of consor-
tium for a negligently injured parent.40
The Nebraska Supreme Court, with Justice Shanahan and Justice
White dissenting, applied the logic employed in Borer and Hoesing
and affirmed the decision of the district court. The court determined
that the difficulty in calculating awards, the multiplication of actions,
and lack of legal entitlement were sufficient reasons in themselves to
deny recovery.4 ' The court reasoned that the lost care and affection a
child suffers when a parent is negligently killed is recoverable as a
separate award while the same care and affection a child loses when a
parent is negligently injured is not.42 The aggravated costs and in-
creased expenditure of resources supposedly far outweighed any bene-
fits of such a claim.43 The court concluded that an arbitrary line
needed to be established to limit liability, and it decided to draw one
in this case. The court maintained that the social burden placed upon
society would be too great to allow recovery. Any award to a child was
supposedly factored in with a spouse's claim for loss of consortium for
a negligently injured spouse.44 Supporting the court is an extensive
body of case law which suggests that these three traditional argu-
ments are well founded upon legal precedent.45
VIII. ANALYSIS
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision not to allow a child to re-
cover the loss of consortium for a negligently injured parent appears to
be rather unthoughtful when examined in light of other loss of consor-
tium claims. A child should be able to recover loss of consortium for
an injured parent because it is logically inconsistent to allow a parent
to recover for loss of consortium for a negligently injured child and not
40. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 415-16, 495 N.W.2d 286, 286 (1993).
41. Id. at 419-20, 495 N.W.2d at 287-88.
42. Id. at 419, 495 N.W.2d at 288.
43. See Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 479 (D. Neb. 1980); Borer
v. American Airlines, Inc. 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977); Russell v. Salem Transp.
Co., Inc., 295 A.2d 862, 864 (N.J. 1972).
44. The court did not explicitly state this reasoning in the case. However, the court
concluded its opinion by stating that "for the reasons articulated by the federal
district court in Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, we elect not to modify
the common law by recognizing a cause of action...." Guenther v. Stollberg, 242
Neb. 415, 421, 495 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1993). Consequently, this reasoning follows
from the decision in Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D.
Neb. 1980).
45. However, Justice Shanahan wrote a stinging dissent. Justice Shanahan criti-
cized his fellow judges for their logical inconsistencies in denying recovery and
proceeded to explain the flaws in allowing a parent to recover loss of consortium
for an injured child but not a child for an injured parent. Guenther v. Stollberg,
242 Neb. 415, 422-25, 495 N.W.2d 286, 289-91 (1993) (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
1994]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the reverse. 46 Theoretically, the care and affection in a parent-child
relationship are expressed and shared by both the child and the par-
ent. Denying recovery to a child suggests that the parent suffers a
greater loss when the child's consortium is interrupted by a negligent
tortfeasor. At the least, the child is as equally affected by the inter-
ruption of the parent's care and affection as the parent is in the re-
verse situation. Realistically, the child probably suffers greater harm
from the cessation of the parent's companionship due to the naive and
defenseless nature of the child.47
Even more perplexing and contradictory is the ability of a child to
recover consortium for the wrongful death of a parent but not for an
injury to a parent when the relationships between the two are identi-
cal. The delineating criteria for recovery appears to be the death of a
parent. As Justice Shanahan stated, "a casket cannot be the solitary
standard for compensating a child's loss of parental consortium."48
Further, the three traditional counter arguments used to refute chil-
dren's claims, (1) lack of legal entitlement, (2) multiplicity of suits, and
(3) the difficulty of calculating damages,49 fail to withstand scrutiny
when compared to the logic supporting the award of other consortium
claims.50
46. Gallimore granted a child a consortium claim expressly on these grounds. Gal-
limore v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993). See supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
47. Other courts place great emphasis on the parent-child relationship. In Villareal
v. State Department of Transportation, 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989), minor children
brought a cause of action for loss of consortium for their negligently injured fa-
ther who had suffered severe injuries when his motorcycle crashed into a high-
way construction site. The trial court granted the state's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that a child did not have a cause of action for loss of
parental consortium. The children filed an appeal with the court of appeals and
the case was removed to the Arizona Supreme Court. The Arizona Supreme
Court vacated the decision and remanded the case to the trial court, thereby es-
tablishing a cause of action for a child's consortium claim in Arizona. The court
stated that "[wihile all family members enjoy a mutual interest in consortium,
the parent-child relationship is undeniably unique .... [it is the parent-child
relationship which most deserves protection and which, in fact, has received judi-
cial protection in the past." Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 217
(Ariz. 1989)(quoting Frank v. Super. Ct., 722 P.2d 955, 956 n.3 (Ariz. 1986)). See
also Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Wis. 1984)(observing that
while an adult is capable of seeking out new relationships, a child is virtually
helpless in seeking out a new adult companion to take the place of a negligently
injured parent).
48. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 425-26, 495 N.W.2d 286, 291 (1993)
(Shanahan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 418, 495 N.W.2d at 287.
50. See Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993).
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A. Legal Entitlement
The court first and foremost relied on the traditional argument
that children are not legally entitled to recover for a negligently in-
jured parent.5 ' While the court followed the line of logic used in High
v. Howard,52 the idea that a parent is not legally obliged to provide
love and affection for her children no longer appears valid in light of
recent litigation. Moreover, this reasoning becomes especially suspect
since High has since been overturned in Gallimore v. Children's Hos-
pital Medical Center.53
Children who were often considered to be without rights in the
eyes of the law have made rapid gains in recent years. For instance,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a child has a
due process right to notice and an informal hearing in school discipli-
nary proceduresS4 and that equal protection exists for illegitimate
children to maintain an action for nonsupport of a parent.55 In Ne-
braska, the parental duty to provide care and affection has been recog-
nized in proceedings to terminate parental rights.56 As Justice
Shanahan emphasized in his dissent, such recognition of the failure of
a parent to provide care and affection for a child as a basis for termi-
nating parental rights leads to a conclusion that the interference of
the duty by a tortfeasor provides a right for compensation to the
child.57 If a parent is injured to such an extent that the recognized
51. Id.
52. 592 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio 1992), overruled by Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Medical
Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993). In this case, two children brought an action
for loss of consortium when their father was injured in an automobile accident.
The trial court dismissed the claim. The court of appeals and the Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed, citing that a child had no legal entitlement to the parent's consor-
tium. Further, no common law action existed for the child's recovery of
consortium.
53. 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993). The court, in reversing itself, stated, "[riegardless
of who suffers the physical injury (parent or child), the other member of the par-
ent-child relationship may suffer loss of the consortium for the injured victim."
Id. at 1060.
54. Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
55. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
56. In re A.G.G., 230 Neb. 707, 433 N.W.2d 185 (1988).
57. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415,423,495 N.W.2d 286,290 (1993)(Shanahan,
J., dissenting). Justice Shanahan relied heavily upon In re A.G.G., 230 Neb. 707,
433 N.W.2d 185 (1988). There, in a juvenile proceeding to terminate parental
rights under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, the court recognized the parental duty
to provide a child with love and companionship. Judge Shanahan reasoned that
because of the judicial recognition of consortium, it is therefore impossible to
deny the child the right to expect a parent's love and companionship. The child is
therefore entitled to these benefits that a parent is legally obligated to provide.
Consequently, tortious interference with the child's expectation of a parent's love
and companionship should be subject to a remedy under civil law. Guenther v.
Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 423-24, 495 N.W.2d 286, 290 (1993)(Shanahan, J.,
dissenting).
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obligation to provide care and affection is interrupted in any way by
the negligence of a third party, a child must then have a right to seek
adequate compensation from that third party.
Even if the court insists that there is no common law right to the
care and affection of a parent, the Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that
it is not necessary for an interest to be a legally entitled interest for
there to be compensable damages. In Weitl v. Moses,58 children
sought loss of consortium damages stemming from injuries sustained
by their mother when she was treated for bronchitis and experienced
cardiac arrest, resulting in permanent brain damage and blindness.
The trial court dismissed the children's claim, but the Iowa Supreme
Court reversed, allowing recovery.5 9 The court concluded that even if
a child did not have legal entitlement to a parent's consortium, the
child only needed to show that there was a reasonable certainty of
receiving a parent's care and affection in order to be compensated. If
there was a reasonable certainty of receiving benefits, which a
tortfeasor denied, then compensation should result.60 A child ordina-
rily and usually without exception expects the care and affection of a
parent. Consequently, it would appear to be a matter of mere formal-
ity for a child to establish this expectation in court and thus be enti-
tled to compensation for the denial of the expected consortium.
Moreover, the inconsistency in allowing a child to recover for the
wrongful death of a parent and not for a negligently injured parent
further crumbles the foundation of the court's logic in Guenther. If a
child is compensated for the love and affection lost in the wrongful
death of a parent, then the same love and affection which is lost when
a parent is negligently injured is compensable as well. 61 The relation-
ships are exactly the same. 62 Justice Shanahan makes reference to
this inconsistency in quoting Ueland in his dissent.6 3 In fact, the
court's opinion appears to be less an inconsistency but more an
unimaginative decision which disregards all notion of logic or balance.
58. 311 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Iowa 1981).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 192 (Wash. 1984).
62. Id.
63. Guenther v. Stollberg 242 Neb. 415, 423, 495 N.W.2d 286, 290 (1993)(Shanahan,
J., dissenting). Justice Shanahan uses Ueland extensively because it succinctly
attacks the three traditional arguments employed by the majority. Further, it
incorporates relevant case law on both sides of the issue in promulgating an opin-
ion that justifies a loss of consortium claim for a child. Perhaps a little unrealis-
tic in believing that a consortium claim can heal a child's emotional wounds, it
directly uncovers the fallacies behind the traditional logic of multiplicity, legal
entitlement, and calculation of damages in denying a consortium award.
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While a child cannot recover for loss of consortium, a parent can
recover for a negligently injured child.64 This suggests that a child's
loss of love and affection is remote and ineffectual when compared to
the loss a parent feels when a child is injured. Yet the relationship is
essentially the same. In fact, depriving a child of care and affection
may be more detrimental than the parent's loss of these same in-
tangibles. According to the court in Villareal v. State Department of
Transportation,65 the parent-child relationship is not only unique but
it is the wellspring from which all other family relationships develop.
If any relationship deserves protection, it is the parent-child relation-
ship.66 The loss of a parent's care and affection can greatly affect a
child's development and her mental perspective for the rest of her
life.67 Since the child suffers most from the interruption of parental
care, it necessarily follows that a child ought not to be denied
recovery.68
B. Multiplicity of Suits and Duplication of Awards
Once it has been established that children are entitled to recover
for lost consortium, other policy reasons used by the court to deny re-
covery fall prey to similar logical inconsistencies discussed previously.
The court opines that allowing a child to recover consortium will lead
to an explosion of suits and the possibility of double recovery by the
64. Macku v. Drackett Products Co., 216 Neb. 176, 343 N.W.2d 58 (1984)(recognizing
common law cause of action for consortium for negligently injured child).
65. 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989).
66. Id. at 217(quoting Frank v. Super. Ct., 722 P.2d 955, 956 (Ariz. 1986)). See also
Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513,515-16 (Wis. 1984)(opining that it is
of highest importance to child and society that the child's right to receive benefits
derived from its parents are protected).
67. Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 217 (Ariz. 1989).
68. Weitl v. Moses, 311 N.W.2d 259, 268 (Iowa 1981); Theama v. City of Kenosha,
344 N.W.2d 513, 518 (Wis. 1984).
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court did not raise the issue, one wonders if
the majority felt it best to leave the decision on whether to grant consortium to a
child to the Legislature. However, both the upkeep of common law and the expan-
sion of tort law are well within the jurisdiction of the courts. Villareal v. State
Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 219 (Ariz. 1989); Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull
Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 193 (Wash. 1984). The court should not refuse to accept this
responsibility in light of the logical inconsistencies evident in refusing to allow
loss of consortium for a negligently injured parent when compared to other con-
sortium claims.
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plaintiff.69 Therefore, any award made to the spouse will or should
include the recovery for the child.70
There will be a degree of increase in the amount of suits if no re-
strictions are placed upon who may maintain a cause of action for a
negligently injured parent. More than likely, a claim will be raised in
practically all situations in which a parent is negligently injured.71
Some courts have gone as far in their opposition to paint nightmarish
scenes of a family with nine children bringing nine separate loss of
consortium claims for one injured parent.7 2 The possibility exists that
claims will increase two-fold if both parents are negligently injured,
entitling each child to a separate award for each individual parent.
Even without multiple children and injuries to both parents, the prob-
lem still exists that a child's claim will be brought separately from the
parent's loss of spousal consortium. If the court allows this scenario to
unfold without any restrictions, the administrative costs and expendi-
69. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 418, 495 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1993Xquoting
Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478,481 (D. Neb. 1980)). See also
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 863 (Cal. 1977)(allowing recovery
will lead to as many companion claims as the injured parent had minor children);
Dearborn Fabricating & Engin. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1137 (Ind.
1990)(dening recovery due to fear of multiplicity of suits); Salin v. Kloempken,
322 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982)(citing both the fear of proliferation of claims
and multiplicity of suits in denying recovery); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., Inc.,
295 A.2d 862, 864 (N.J. 1972)(stating additional companion claims will double if
both parents are injured).
The court in De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 449 N.E.2d 406 (N.Y. 1983)
specifically rested its denial of recovery upon the potential explosion of litigation,
saying, "[a] line must be drawn between the competing policy considerations of
providing a remedy to everyone who is injured and of extending exposure to tort
liability almost without limit." Id. at 407.
70. Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478,481 (D. Neb. 1980); Dearborn
Fabricating & Engin. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1138 (Ind. 1990)(compensat-
ing child through award to parent); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., Inc., 295 A.2d
862, 864 (N.J. 1972)(determining that consequential disadvantages to children of
injured parents are reflected in jury awards to parents on their own claims).
71. In Borer, the court worried extensively about the multiplication of suits, stating.
[wihereas the assertion of a spouse's demand for loss of consortium in-
volves the joining of only a single companion claim in the action with
that of an injured person, the right here debated would entail as many
companion claims as the injured parent had minor children, each claim
entitled to separate appraisal and award. The defendant's burden would
be further enlarged if the claims were founded upon injuries to both
parents.
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 863 (Cal. 1977).
In Russell v. Salem Transportation Co., 295 A.2d 862, (N.J. 1972), the court
concluded that "the right here debated would entail adding as many companion
claims as the injured parent had minor children, each such claim entitled to sepa-
rate appraisal and award." Id. at 864.
72. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 863 (Cal. 1977)(observing that a
mother with nine children could spawn nine separate claims).
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ture of resources could be too great to consider allowing the child the
right to recover.73
However, the fear of an explosion of litigation almost always ac-
companies new tort causes of action.74 To prevent a rise in litigation,
Nebraska could establish ground rules utilized in other jurisdictions.
First, liability should be limited to the immediate family, that being
only children of the injured parent.75 In this way, cousins, nieces, and
nephews are prohibited from bringing claims for loss of consortium.
An interesting question arises as to whether children who live
outside the home of the injured parent as part of a divorce settlement
should be entitled to loss of consortium. Perhaps the best answer is to
allow a claim and let the jury ultimately decide the value of that rela-
tionship. More questionable, however, is whether a stepchild living in
the home of the injured parent can recover. Once again, a claim
should probably be allowed.76 The jury should be able to make an ad-
equate determination of the value of that relationship. It seems un-
just to allow one child in the home to recover but not another due
solely to the fact that one child is biologically related to the parent. In
some cases, the relationship to the stepchild will be closer than that of
the biologically related child. In any event, the loss of care and affec-
tion denied by the tortfeasor to either child should be compensated.
Second, a working definition must be established that will prevent
claims from arising from minor or insignificant injuries. If a child is
allowed to file suit for the two-day hospital stay of a parent, then the
expenditure of resources in administering such a suit far outstrip any
possible benefits. Nebraska could adopt the definition used by the
73. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 420, 495 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1993)(quoting
Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D. Neb. 1980)). For
example, children could raise a suit for a two-day hospital stay by an injured
parent.
74. Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Wis. 1984). See Dwork, supra
note 9, at 732. But is such a notion, if true, sufficient to deny the child a right to
recover the loss of companionship of a negligently injured parent? Justice White
in his dissent did not think so. He stated that Nebraska should be guided by
article I, section 13 of the Nebraska Constitution, which says "[a]U courts shall be
open, and every person, for any injury done him in his... person... shall have
remedy by due course of law, and justice shall be administered without denial or
delay." Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 421, 495 N.W.2d 286, 289
(1993)(White, J., dissenting).
75. Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 219 (Ariz. 1989)(proper plaintiff
is child of negligently injured parent. Injuries to siblings, grandparents, rela-
tives, or friends do not qualify); Weitl v. Moses, 311 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Iowa
1981)(denying recovery to anyone but children); Berger v. Weber, 313 N.W.2d 424
(Mich. 1981)(limiting cause of action to parent-child relationship); Reagan v.
Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1990)(distinguishing between interests of
children and other more remote relatives.
76. Villareal allows a child a claim for both biological and adoptive parents. Villareal
v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 219 (Ariz. 1989).
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court in Villareal. In Villareal, the court limited recovery to only
those situations in which there is "serious, permanent and disabling
injuries."7 7 The parent's injuries must sever any ability to render
love, companionship, and guidance to the child. In effect, the parent-
child relationship is altogether destroyed or nearly destroyed. 78 In
this way, claims for a two-day hospital stay are eliminated. Such
claims deprive the child of a parent's consortium for such a limited
time that litigating them proves to be an unnecessary waste of judicial
resources.
Additionally, claims could be limited to minor children.79 This
would further reduce the number of claims. An older child hypotheti-
cally suffers less of a loss than a younger child such as a pre-schooler.
Yet no matter what the age of the child, there still will be a certain
degree of care and affection afforded that child.80 However, in the in-
terest of conserving resources and in light of a modern day society in
which children have often left the home by the age of majority, it ap-
pears prudent to limit any awards to minor children. After all, it is
the parent-child relationship to the minor child which will hinder or
help his or her development and which must be protected.S1 The adult
child has already received the majority of the benefit of the parental
relationship. Consequently, the adult child's loss is not as devastat-
ing, nor is the recovery as important.82
77. Id. at 216. See also Keele v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Center, 852 P.2d
574 (Mont. 1993)(limiting recovery to situations in which parent suffers serious,
permanent, disabling mental or physical injury in which the parent's condition is
so overwhelming that the parent-child relationship is destroyed or very nearly
destroyed); Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vermont, 496 A.2d 939, 941 (Vt.
1985)(allowing recovery only when parent rendered permanently comatose);
Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Wis. 1984)(allowing recovery
when father's permanent mental and physical injuries essentially deprived minor
children of any further parent-child exchange).
78. Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 219 (Ariz. 1989).
79. In the following cases, the courts limited recovery to minor children only: Weitl
v. Moses, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.,
413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis.
1984). Other courts have left any age limitation to the discretion of the legisla-
ture: Audubon-Exira v. Illinois Cent. Gulf. R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983);
Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1990); Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull
Corp., 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984).
80. Audubon-Exira v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Iowa 1983).
81. Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 217 (Ariz. 1989).
82. But, by limiting recovery, the same logical inconsistencies again rear their heads.
To be consistent, all children should be allowed to bring a claim for loss of consor-
tium regardless of the age of the child. Audubon-Exira v. Illinois Cent. Gulf. R.
Co., 335 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Iowa 1983). While awards may vary significantly, it is
impossible to limit the recipients without manufacturing the same inconsisten-
cies that should be avoided in the first place.
Another interesting proposition is that of the adult mentally retarded or phys-
ically handicapped child that is still dependant upon the parent. A severing of
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Once claims have been limited to a workable definition, the prob-
lem of nine children bringing nine different suits for two injured par-
ents still remains. Such a problem may be addressed in one of three
ways. The best solution to this problem lies in the compulsory joinder
of the child's or children's claims with those of the spouse.8 3 Usually,
the child's claim will be brought with the parent's claim similar to the
joining of the injured spouse's negligence claim and the other spouse's
loss of consortium claim.8 4 In those instances when both suits are not
brought together, the child should be allowed to bring a claim only if it
is joined with the parent's claim. A second possible option is to require
joinder whenever it is feasible. Only if the child can show good cause
for not joining her claim, will she be allowed to bring it later.85 A
third method of eliminating multiplicity permits the defendant faced
with separate claims to insist that the spouse's claim be joined with
that of the child's. In this way, the defendant would not be left facing
an outstanding consortium claim.8 6 Adoption of one of these three
joinder rules eliminates nine separate consortium claims brought at
different times. 8 7
If the multiplicity problem has been solved, there still remains the
issue of double recovery. In those courts which have decided against
separate recovery for children, they have theorized that the parent or
the parent's love and affection could prove devastating to the adult child. In such
a situation, a court should allow recovery, even if the court has previously deter-
mined that only minor children should be allowed recovery. Perhaps then the
best rule is to leave all such decisions concerning age to the jury.
83. Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 220 (Ariz. 1989); Dearborn
Fabricating & Engin. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. 1990); Weiti v. Moses,
311 N.W.2d 259, 268 (Iowa 1981); Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d
190, 194 (Wash. 1984).
84. Diaz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 560 (Mass. 1973). In a claim for spousal
consortium, the court reasoned that multiplicity of suits was a nonfactor because
the claim for consortium will most likely be brought at the same time as the in-
jured spouse's negligence claim. Id.
85. Weitl v. Moses, 311 N.W.2d 259, 268 (Iowa 1981).
86. Diaz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 560-61 (Mass. 1973). Similar reasoning
was employed in a spouse's consortium claim. The same argument regarding
multiplicity of suits became a central point of the case. The court concluded that
allowing the defendant to insist that claims be joined eliminates the issue from
essentially being litigated at different times.
87. There remains one possible stumbling block to consolidation of claims. Dearborn
Fabricating & Engin. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1137 (Ind. 1990). See also
Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982)(citing statute of limitations
concerns as a reason for denying child's consortium claim). Most states, like Ne-
braska, have a statute tolling the statute of limitations for minors. NEB. Rv.
STAT. § 25-213 (Reissue 1989). The statute of limitations would then have to be
altered to allow for a uniform limitations period for both the parent's action and
the child's loss of consortium claim.
19941 449
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
parents' claims will cover any loss of consortium for the child.88 Pro-
tection then is afforded the defendant from having to pay the parent's
claim with the child's loss of consortium calculated in the award and
then having to pay a child's separate award. Yet, to capitulate to
these protective measures admits that juries are incapable of follow-
ing instructions.8 9 The danger of double recovery does exist when a
judge does not properly instruct the jury, and the jury considers all
damage done to the family unit in the parent's claim rather than just
considering the damage to the spouse bringing the claim. In his dis-
sent, Justice Shanahan promptly refuted the threat of double recovery
when he stated "the specter of double recoveries, as one of the 'things
that go bump in the night' vanishes in the light of adequate jury in-
structions to provide the correct standard for awarding damages."90
Consequently, in order to eliminate this danger, the jury needs to be
instructed that the child's claim covers only the loss of the parent's
care and affection, and the parent's recovery is limited to the injured
parent's loss of pecuniary ability to support the family unit.91
A separate recovery may be better for all parties concerned. Pro-
viding for two separate, distinct awards allows both the parent's claim
and the child's claim to be openly argued and debated.92 Before, the
child's award was lumped together with that of the parent's without
any discussion as to what the child's recovery should have been. Now,
both sides can present evidence to establish what value should be
placed on the child's consortium claim. Further, the separate awards
allow for the child to use her award for her benefit rather than giving
it to the parent to use as the parent sees fit.93
Overall, it may be better for the defendant to allow a separate
claim for the child's consortium. By allowing separate discussion on
the award of consortium to a child, it is conceivable that in this sepa-
rate debate the defendant may be forced to pay a judgment that is less
than what would have been awarded had the claim not been separated
from that of the parent.
88. Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 481 (D. Neb. 1980); Borer v. Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 863 (Cal. 1977); Dearborn Fabricating & Engin.
v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1138 (Ind. 1990); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co.,
Inc., 295 A.2d 862, 864 (N.J. 1972).
89. Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 194-95 (Wash. 1984).
90. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415,424,495 N.W.2d 286,291 (1993)(Shanahan,
J., dissenting).
91. Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 218 (Ariz. 1989); Weitl v. Moses,
311 N.W.2d 259, 268 (Iowa 1981); Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d
190, 194-95 (Wash. 1984); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513,521 (Wis.
1984).
92. Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Mich. 1981)(quoting the appellate court's
decision in the same case).
93. Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 520-21 (Wis. 1984).
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C. Calculation of the Award
In any consortium claim, money cannot replace the loss suffered by
the individual party. This is the logic utilized in denying recovery for
a child's consortium claim.94 Consortium is an intangible award for
which there cannot be a precise monetary value.95 It is also true that
money damages alone will never allow a child to regain the loss of care
and affection a severely injured parent can no longer offer.96 As spec-
ulative as a consortium claim is for a child, it is no more speculative
than a consortium claim for a parent in regard to a negligently injured
child, or consortium in a wrongful death suit.9 7 Those courts which
have allowed a child to recover loss of consortium have recognized the
uncertainty of placing a dollar value on the care and affection provided
by a parent.98 However poor a money substitute may be, "it is the
only workable way to ease loss."99
It would appear to be inaccurate to label the award for a child's
claim of consortium for a negligently injured parent more difficult to
calculate than the same award in a wrongful death claim by the child,
since the basis of each claim is the same. Further, the child's consor-
tium claim cannot be any more difficult to calculate than the award for
a parent's claim of consortium for a child or for a negligently injured
spouse. As Justice Shanahan pointed out, the idea that the calcula-
tion of consortium is too speculative is without merit.100 In Nebraska,
the matter is left to the discretion of the jury, and there is no reason
94. Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 479-80 (D. Neb. 1980)(quot-
ing Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977)).
95. Consortium is defined in Nebraska as comfort, society, love, and protection.
Creason v. Myers, 217 Neb. 551, 350 N.W.2d 526 (1984) (citing Sowle v. Sowle,
115 Neb. 795, 215 N.W. 122 (1927) and Larsen v. Larsen, 115 Neb. 601, 213 N.W.
971 (1927)). Obviously, such intangible items as love and companionship are in-
deed difficult to price in terms of value. Each individual has a different definition
of each of these terms. As Elizabeth Barrett Browning so aptly stated, "How do I
love thee? Let me count the ways." Elizabeth B. Browning, Sonnets from the
Portuguese, #43.
96. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 860 (Cal. 1977).
97. Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424,427 (Mich. 1981); Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-PuHl
Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 194 (Wash. 1984); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d
513, 519-20 (Wis. 1984).
98. Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424,427 (Mich. 1981); Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull
Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 194 (Wash. 1984); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d
513, 519-20 (Wis. 1984).
99. Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 520 (Wis. 1984).
100. Justice Shanahan stated, "[tihus, if a fact finder, especially ajury, is competent to
assess the damages for the loss of society, comfort, and companionship suffered
by a parent or spouse, there is no legal reason that ascertaining damages to a
child is impossible when the child's parent is injured." Guenther v. Stollberg, 242
Neb. 415, 424-25, 495 N.W.2d 286, 291 (1993)(Shanahan, J., dissenting).
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why a jury could not likewise place a dollar value on a child's consor-
tium claim.lOl
Some courts, including Guenther, have raised a valid concern about
the actual effect the award would have on a child. These courts have
complained that any award for loss of consortium allows a child to
establish a fund which will enable that child to be wealthy upon reach-
ing adulthood.102 The dissenting opinion in Ueland remarked that
the award will most probably be placed in some type of trust fund
which will not offer direct compensation to the child. It could be ten or
fifteen years before the child receives any amount of the award. By
that time, the opinion argued, the child will be adjusted to the loss and
the award will serve merely as a pleasure account. 0 3
Courts are reluctant to establish such trust funds solely to make a
child independently wealthy upon reaching adulthood. Yet, this
seems an improper if not unjust reason for denying recovery and let-
ting the negligent tortfeasor off the hook. The negligent party still
must be forced to pay a penalty. The problem revolves around how to
distribute the award.
The court in Theama v. City of Kenosha1O4 half-heartedly at-
tempted to dispel this concern by explaining that the award does not
ensure financial prosperity but instead assures the child's continued
normal development.10 5 That may be a little unrealistic. It is hard to
imagine a lump sum of money ensuring that the child's emotional
wounds from losing the companionship of a crippled parent will heal
without a scar.
A better solution to this problem is to allow the funds to be used for
any psychiatric treatment or domestic help now needed to aid the
child to cope with the loss of care and affection of the parent.1 0 6 The
remainder of the award could remain in a trust fund to help pay for a
child's higher education which the negligently injured parent could
have helped provide. This is probably the most practical application of
the award.
101. Id. (quoting Maloney v. Kaminski, 220 Neb. 55, 69-70, 368 N.W.2d 447, 458
(1985)).
102. Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 479 (D. Neb. 1980); Borer v.
American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977).
103. Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 196 (Wash. 1984).
104. 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984). Minor children brought an action for loss of paren-
tal consortium when their father was injured in a motorcycle accident on a dimly
lit highway. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants and
the court of appeals affirmed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.
105. Id. at 520.
106. Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 194 (Wash. 1984).
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D. Insurance Premiums
A final issue which the court raises vicariously through its quota-
tions of HoesingiO7 is the burden of paying for consortium claims by
the general public through increased insurance premiums. The evi-
dence is not available to complete a study to determine if insurance
premiums have risen because of other consortium claims. Addition-
ally, that subject is beyond the scope of this Note. However, it would
certainly appear better to allow recovery for a child who has lost the
care and comfort of the parent than to forbid it based on a notion that
insurance premiums will skyrocket because of the theoretical increase
in claims that opponents declare would occur if recovery is allowed.
Moreover, if a child is denied a separate recovery on such a theory
and is allowed to recover under the parent or parents' claim, then is
the assumption to be made that insurance premiums will not rise in
this instance?' 08 The theory behind the fear of increased insurance
premiums is taken one step further in raising the idea that only those
tortfeasors with adequate liability insurance will be able to make pay-
ments for a separate loss of consortium claim. Especially in automo-
bile accidents, the policy limits will supposedly be exhausted before
the child's claim can be brought to fruition. Only those children's par-
ents who are injured by deep pockets will be able to recover. In the
end, awards will be distributed unevenly.109
But if the child's claim is simply a component of the parent's claim,
it is difficult to see why recovery will be any less uneven in that in-
stance. Whether the child is allowed a separate claim or not, the re-
covery should theoretically be the same, and any fears that recovery
will be unevenly distributed or insurance premiums will skyrocket
should already be the same in both cases. If insurance premiums are
exhausted because of a separate claim, they will be exhausted if the
child's loss of consortium is correctly calculated in an award to a par-
ent. This brings the discussion back to the original argument in which
it would appear to be better for the factors listed above to allow a sepa-
rate recovery to be argued in full view of the court so a more valid
determination could be made of the actual value of recovery.1'0
Some courts have argued that any increase in premiums will be
more than offset by the benefit to society. The hope is that the child
will be able to handle the parent's injury and subsequent loss of affec-
tion without emotional difficulty, and these benefits are best borne by
107. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 419, 495 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1993)(quoting
Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 479-80 (D. Neb. 1980)).
108. Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 438 (Mich. 1981)(Levin, J., dissent-
ing)(discussing rise of insurance premiums if cause of action is allowed).
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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society as a whole."' Realistically, the notion that a child will be able
to function without emotional complications as a result of an award
may be more hopeful than practical. Nonetheless, if an award can be
used to provide counseling and treatment to help a child handle the
loss effectively, then any increases are best handled by placing the
burden on society as a whole.
IX. CONCLUSION
The logical inconsistencies which abound by prohibiting a child to
recover loss of consortium for a negligently injured parent signal the
need for the Nebraska Supreme Court to rethink its position. The
only apparent reason for the court's decision rests on the precedential
weight of previous decisions in other state courts. Remarkably, the
court relied so much on this precedent that it quoted almost entire
pages from previous decisions.1 2 Whether this evidences a lack of re-
flection on the issue or strong agreement with earlier decisions is left
open to debate.
The three historical arguments for denying a child to recover are
irreparably flawed when scrutinized. Even if a child is not entitled to
consortium under common law, a child which expects the companion-
ship and affection of a parent (rare will be the cases it will not) is
entitled to compensation when these benefits are interrupted."i3 Mul-
tiplicity and double recovery should not be a problem with proper join-
der rules and jury instructions,"i 4 and the calculation of the award is
no less difficult than in other consortium claims."i 5
Nebraska should allow recovery for a child's consortium claim in
the case of a negligently injured parent. As a result of Guenther, such
an action is presently prohibited. The future remains another matter.
Perhaps as more states allow a child's claim, the court may alter its
position, especially if Borer were to be overturned in California. Since
both the Hoesing and Guenther opinions rely so heavily on that case, a
reversal in California may prompt the Nebraska Supreme Court to
reexamine its decision. Moreover, if enough states will permit chil-
dren's consortium claims in the future so that the majority of the juris-
dictions would allow recovery, quite possibly the court would reverse
111. Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Mich. 1981); Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull
Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 195 (Wash. 1984).
112. Guenther v. Stollberg, 242 Neb. 415, 419-20, 495 N.W.2d 286, 288-89 (1993).
Justice White, in his dissent, criticized the court for relying so heavily on Hoes-
ing. He stated "[t]he concern of a non-common law court for the difficulties of a
court administering the common law is neither persuasive or controlling." Id. at
421, 495 N.W.2d at 289 (White, J., dissenting).
113. See supra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 69-93 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
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itself. The unimaginative opinion in Guenther leads one to believe
that any significant changes in other states or possibly in the composi-
tion of the court would invite the Nebraska Supreme Court to recon-
sider Guenther. The logical inconsistencies in Guenther should be
reversed and Nebraska should permit a child to recover the loss of
care and affection of a negligently injured parent.'1 6
Brian A Mark '95
116. In light of the recent decision in Gallimore, a similar scenario could take place in
Nebraska, especially if the court undergoes a significant change in the coming
months. It should be noted, however, that the most ardent critic of Guenther,
Justice Shanahan, has since left the court for a federal judgeship.
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